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This paper analyzes the way in which income tax and liquidity determine the purchase or 
rental of a permanent home in Spain. To do this, we have developed a theoretical dynamic 
model based on Euler’s equation. This model is verified using a sample from the 1991-
1995 Panel of income taxpayers. Results suggest that the degree of financial restriction is 
the most relevant variable when determining the possibility of purchasing a home, while tax 
incentives increase their relative weighting once this asset has been acquired. Incentives for 
renting a home are relatively insignificant particularly for taxpayers who habitually rent 
their homes. 
 
Key words: personal income tax, liquidity, permanent home, tax incentives 
JEL classification: H21, H24, H31 
   3 
1.  Introduction 
 
  The preference to purchase a permanent home instead of renting one has been one 
of the principal characteristics of the demand for housing in the last 40 years in Spain. In 
the  sixties,  67%  of  people  owned  their  homes  while  in  the  eighties  this  percentage 
increased to 78% and in the nineties it reached 86%. In comparative terms, the distribution 
of the housing stock presents two features which differentiate the Spanish situation from 
other EU member States. Firstly, the ownership of permanent homes is greater in Spain 
than in the other EU members, the average in 1999 was 61%. Secondly, social renting 
represents 2% in Spain, this percentage being the lowest in the EU -the average EU value 
was 18% in 1999- (see Trilla, 2001). 
 
  These  differences  are  due  to  the  implementation  of  non-neutral  public  policies 
regarding modes of access to a permanent housing
1. As a result market forces have been 
artificially biased towards home ownership therefore limiting citizens’ ability to choose
2. 
Tax policy implemented in Spain during recent years has encouraged this situation for 
different reasons. Firstly, tax incentives for the acquisition of a permanent home are more 
favorable. In the period 1978-1998, Income Tax Law allowed tax deductions from the tax 
base in terms of mortgage interests and from the tax liability in terms of sums paid for the 
purchase –i.e. reimbursement of the principal. Since 1999 both concepts have been applied 
at the tax liability level
3. Secondly, renting has had very few direct grants and very few tax 
incentives –during the last two decades, income tax deductions with respect to the rental of 
a permanent home were only available between 1992 and 1998- while price control policies 
                                                 
1  See González-Páramo and Onrubia (1991), for a detailed description of the arguments in favor of public 
intervention in housing. 
2 The theoretical effects of economic and tax variables on the housing market have been extensively 
studied by López García (1992, 1996, 1997a, 1997b, 2001) 
3 See Onrubia and Sanz (1999), Sanz (2000) and Onrubia, Romero and Sanz (2002), for an analysis of the 
effects of 40/98 Act on the tax treatment of homes.   4 
have been in force until recently. Finally as we noted above, public resources devoted to 
building of subsidized housing have been few and far between
4. 
 
  In Spain, as in other developed countries there is an extensive literature on the 
study of different aspects related to the decision to buy a permanent home: the deciding 
aspects  timing,  location,  quality,  size,  etc.  The  empirical  evidence  available  for  Spain 
enables us to conclude as follows:  
 
-  Disposable income is the major determinant in a house purchase (See Jaén and Molina, 
1994, Lasheras, Salas and Pérez Villacastín, 1994, Duce, 1995, Sanromán, 2000). 
 
-  Price increases and levels are correlated to economic and tax variables. Thus, Bover 
(1993) found there was a positive relationship between price increases and income. 
However, López García’s estimations (2001) implemented under different assumptions 
indicated that the permanent removal of incentives would reduce house price by 16%-
30%. 
 
-  There is a certain contradiction in the results when the effectiveness of tax incentives is 
analyzed though on he whole there are more studies that question its efficacy. On the 
one hand, Jaén and Molina’s simulations indicate that the removal of incentives would 
reduce  the  cost  of  house  purchases  by  16%-21%,  contrary  to  results  presented  in 
López García’s paper (2001). On the other hand evidence, provided in the studies 
carried out by Las Heras, Salas and Pérez Villacastín (1994) and Sanromán (2000) using 
                                                 
4 For example, there have been almost 23,000 applications for renting social in the context of a recent 
promotion of less than 300 houses for rent carried out by the Empresa Municipal de la Vivienda de 
Madrid (the Madrid Local Authority Housing Company).   5 
microdata, shows that the relevance of tax variables is small when compared with the 
influence of disposable income. 
 
-  Finally, other socio-economic and demographic variables are relevant when deciding to 
purchase a house such as marital status (see Sanromán, 2000), the age of the head of 
the household (see Jaén and Molina, 1994; Duce, 1995) their gender and educational 
level (Jaén and Molina, 1994; Colom and Cruz, 1997), the place of residence and their 
type of economic activity. (see Colom and Cruz, 1997). 
 
  Results  indicate  that  disposable  income  is  the  most  important  variable  when 
purchasing a permanent home in Spain. The purchase of a home (new or not) requires the 
payment of a deposit–which may account for 20% of the purchase price- and  a capacity  
to borrow which house demanders who are subject to financial restrictions may not have 
(see Stiglitz and Weiss 1981) . Credit capacity as a requirement for buying a home is closely 
linked to variables such as income -current or expected- and wealth. Thus, individuals with 
fewer economic resources will face a greater likelihood of credit rationing, which presents 
an obstacle to a house purchase, and affects issues such as the timing of purchasing a 
home, the replacement of purchasing by renting in order to obtain access to a home and a 
delay to children leaving the family home. 
 
  The purpose of this research is to build and estimate a theoretical model which will 
enables us to analyze the joint role which financial and tax variables play in the marginal 
decisions about permanent housing. For this, we will analyze the main tools in the income 
tax supporting the purchase or rental of the habitual residence. In this context individuals 
have, in the absence of perfect capital markets –as defined by Modigliani-Miller (1958)-   6 
different degrees of financial restrictions. To this effect, a dynamic model of demand for 
housing is used and is verified by a sample of the 1991-1995 income taxpayers. 
 
  The study is structured as follows: Section I describes income tax incentives for 
purchasing and renting a permanent home in Spain. Section II advances a dynamic model 
of  demand  for  housing. Section  3  shows  data  used  and  parameterization.  The  specific 
econometric technique used and results are presented in section 4. Finally, we provide our 
conclusions. 
 
2.  Income tax treatment of the purchase and renting of a permanent housing in 
the 1991-1995 period 
 
  Until the 1998 Income Tax Reform, the treatment of the purchase of a permanent 
home had been characterized by the following: (a) a 2% tax allowance for the greatest of 
the following: cadastral value
5, or purchase value or value verified by the administration. (b) 
In relation to mortgage interest and property tax payments -800,000 pesetas (4,808 euros) 
and  1,000,000  pesetas  (6,000  euros)  for  individual  and  joint  taxation  respectively-  as 
deductible expenses. (c) a 15% tax credit on the sums paid for the acquisition or renovation 
of a permanent home. This deduction may be up to 30% of the net tax base. (d) Since 1992 
a 15% tax credit has been introduced for contributions to a saving account targeted at the 
purchase of a permanent home. 
 
  As regards renting a permanent home between 1992 and 1995 Income Tax Law 
provided  for  a  15%  deduction  from  tax  liability  on  sums  paid  as  rent.  The  limit  on 
deductions in the time period studied is 75,000 pesetas (450 euros) for a maximum annual 
expenditure of 500,000 pesetas (3,000 euros). This deduction was subject to two additional   7 
requirements. Firstly, the deduction was limited to fiscal units having a tax base smaller 
than a specific sum. Between 1992 and 1993 this sum was 2 million pesetas (12,000 euros) 
for a separate tax return and 3 million pesetas (18,000 euros) for a joint return. These sums 
increased in 1994 to 3 and 4 millions pesetas respectively (18,000 and 24,000 euros). In the 
1995  tax  year,  such  limits  were  3.5  and  5  million  pesetas  (21,035  and  30,000  euros). 
Secondly, the rent paid had to exceed 10% of the taxpayer’s net income. 
 
3.  Theoretical specification 
 
  A partial equilibrium model of demand for a permanent home is proposed in this 
section.  Housing  markets  are  considered  to  be  competitive  and  thus  require  demand 
functions to be estimated assuming a perfectly elastic supply curve (see Lasheras, Salas and 
Pérez-Villacastín, 1994).  
 
  The  approach  we  are  using  consists,  using  particular  prices,  in  considering  the 
behavior  of  the  consumer  as  a  problem  of  intertemporal  maximization  of  liquidity, 
enabling us to reach a specific utility level. Liquidity is a broad concept comprising not only 
disposable  income  but  also  financial  or  real  assets  easily  convertible  into  money.  This 
approach  provides  us  with  an  adequate  framework  to  analyze  explicitly  the  effects  of 
liquidity and income tax incentives on the demand for a permanent home. 
 
( ) { } 1 , 1 , , + + + = t i it t i t i I it E B Max H
it
π π       (1) 
 
 
  Where it H is the discounted value of the present and future liquidity in t,  it π is the 
available liquidity in the  tperiod,  () ⋅ it E  is the expectations operator conditioned by the 
                                                                                                                                               
5 When cadastral values are updated, imputed income is 1.1%.   8 
information available in t, and  ( ) 1 , 0 ∈ it B  is the discount factor applicable to each tax unit. 
The minimum utility level  0 v  which must be reached under an intertemporal approach is as 
follows: 
 
( ) ( ) 0 1 , 1 , 1 1 , , , v H p v H p v t i t i it t i it it it ≥ + + + + + β     (2) 
 
  () ⋅ it v  being a growing, concave and twice differentiable function. Moreover, we 
assume  that  the  utility  function  is  separable  and  additive.  However,  it p   is  a  vector 
capturing the rent and purchase price of a permanent home , and the price of other durable 
and non-durable goods. The liquidity restriction is: 
 
          0 ≥ it π             (3) 
 
  As prices are considered exogenous, the accounting liquidity equation in which the 
tax treatment of the permanent home is explicitly incorporated is set out in expression (4). 
Herein  we  assume  that  individuals  buy  a  permanent  home  and  intend  to  keep  it 
indefinitely. In short, we assume that a permanent home is not purchased for speculative 
purposes. For this reason, as our interest focuses on the analysis of the houses bought 
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  Where 
C
it Y denotes  net  returns  from  acquisition  and  ownership  of  a  permanent 
home  on  PIT  grounds  - it B   and  it G -  being  respectively  gross  income  and  deducible 
expenditure from this income item. Variable 
0
it Y  denotes the other income in PIT and  it t  is 
the marginal PIT tax rate. Variables 
C
it W , 
A
it W , 
O
it W  are respectively the effective tax credit 
related to the purchase and rental of a permanent home as well as the other deductions 
allowed according to this tax. On the other hand,  it γ ,  it Γ ,  it K , it Ψ  are respectively, the 
percentage of tax credit related to the purchase and rental of a permanent home, the stock 
of permanent homes at the end of the t period and a parameter weighting the rental price 
of a home. Finally, it it L D , , denote respectively the market value of the debt and assets in 
the t tax year. 
 
The valuation of the stock of permanent homes on grounds of PIT is denoted in 
expression (5). The capital accumulation process depends on investment in houses i.e. the 
agreed price paid irrespective of inflation and economic depreciation processes. 
 
1 , − + = t i it it K I K         (5) 
 
  Where  it K  is the capital stock in period  t, and  it I  is investment in homes in the 
same period. In the PIT tax year, income in terms of permanent homes is calculated on the 
basis of its value for the purpose of this tax, 
∗
i K   -cadastral or purchase value according to 
regulations- and of weighting coefficientα .  
 
      ( )
∗ ∗ = = i t t i it K K f B α α ,         (6) 
   10 
In PIT regulations, tax year expenditure derived from the purchase of a permanent 
home is defined as follows: 
 





∗ + − Φ = Φ = i it t i i i t i i it t i t i i it K K K i i K K f G β β 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , , , , ,   (7) 
 
The G value in the t period consists of two addends:  
 
- Firstly, as specified on the right side of expression (7), the financial cost of the debt.  To 
calculate it the following must be taken into account: a) the basis for calculation is the 
difference  between  percentage  i Φ   of  the  purchase  value  debt-financed  and  the 
accumulated stock – as a consequence of the acquisition process- until the end of period 
1 − t . For simplicity we assume that the payments are made annually and b) the interest rate 
of the payment is revised at the end of period  1 − t .  
 
- Secondly, the above expression denotes the sum paid for the tax levied on immovable 
property (which is similar to the property tax in the United Kingdom)),  it β  being the tax 
rate. 
 
The  tax  saving  for  purchasing  a  permanent  home  is  obtained  through  the 
application  of  a  statutory  (marginal)  tax  rate  it γ   on  investment  in  houses  (8).  This 
deduction being limited to 30% of the net tax base (9). Such a limit requires two essential 
issues to be borne in mind. Firstly, provided that this restriction is complied with, the tax 
will subsidize the marginal rate itself γ  and an additional monetary unit of investment of 
any  buyer  of  a  permanent  home.  Secondly, conversely,  an additional  monetary  unit  of 
investment will provide a saving equal to its average value it γˆ .    11 
  ( ) ⋅ = −    , 1 ,t i it it
C
it K I W γ         (8) 
    Subject to:     BL it 30 . 0 ≤ γ           (9)   
 
Moreover, in expression (8) we explicitly assume that, provided that individuals 
plan their taxes, they may amortize a sum greater than the amount of the loan they are 
bound to pay contractually. For this reason, we consider that the unamortized loan at the 
end of the previous tax year is relevant. This variable, together with some others like the 
interest rate, the term of the loan, the tax treatment of these expenses or the liquidity shocks 
affect the tax strategy of individuals with regard to the optimum sum to be amortized in tax 
year t. 
 
  The value of the rental housing stock is denoted in (10), 
m
it K being the value of this 
stock during the period t and  t h  the inflation rate net of depreciation. Regardless of other 
requirements, the change in the value of a house to let is related to improvements carried 
out such as air conditioning, the installation of new baths and kitchens, new floors, etc. We 
assume that this investment 
m
it I is made by the owner in accordance with the wishes of the 
tenants. The latter enjoy the benefits of this investment in exchange for a higher rental 
price  which  actually  finances  this  investment.  In  other  words,  the  tenant  finances  the 








it I h K K + + = − − 1 1 , 1         (10) 
 
The rent for a permanent home paid by the tenants is determined as
m
it itK Ψ ,   it Ψ  
being the parameter weighting the value of the dwelling. As with the tax credit for the   12 
acquisition of a permanent home, the fact that there is an absolute limit sum A, introduces 
differences between the marginal 
it Γ  and average legal rate  it Γ ˆ  that must be taken into 
account  when calculating the tax saving and the restrictions imposed on them. We assume 
that the loan sum is revised at the end of period  1 − t . 
 
m
t i t i it
A
it K W 1 , 1 , − − Ψ Γ =           (11) 
    subject to:   A K
m
t i t i it ≤ Ψ Γ − − 1 , 1 ,           (12) 
 
The Lagrangian and the first order condition determining the optimal investment 
policy  on  housing  are  respectively  denoted  in  expressions  (13)  and  (14),  where  it µ   
represents  the  shadow  price  per  marginal  monetary  unit  of  liquidity  and  it λ   is  the 
parameter associated with the restriction (2). 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 + + + + + + + + = t i it t i it it t i it t i it it v E v E L β λ π β µ π   (13) 
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Implementing the chain rule we have:    
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The value of expressions (16) and (17) is null because 
∗
i K  is a constant,
6 the value 
of which is assumed to be independent of the timeframe for the payment of the home by 
the taxpayer, i. e.  0 ) / ( = ∂ ∂
∗






















        (18) 
 
 
The interest tax deduction –as already explained in section 1- is restricted to an 
absolute  sum  in  PIT.  The  right  side  of  expression  (18)  contains  the  tax  saving  net  of 
depreciation, by monetary unit devoted to the interest payments within the purchase of a 
permanent home. If this limit is not reached, the tax saving will have its marginal value and 











          (19) 
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Expressions  (19)  and  (20)  respectively,  denote  individuals’  tax  saving  when 
devoting an additional monetary unit to the purchase and rental of a permanent home. The 
negative sign of (20) indicates that, for a value of 
m




it K f W , the 
higher  the  value  of   
m
t i K 1 , −   the  smaller  the  investment 
m
it Ι is.  Taking  into  account 
expressions (15) to (19), equation (14) becomes:         
 
                                                 
6 At least as long as there are no changes to cadastral values.   14 
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Using the envelope theorem
7: 
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    (22) 
 
 
Combining (21) and (22) to eliminate  () ⋅ it E  and  () ⋅ it λ , and replacing the result in 
(21) we obtain the implicit Euler’s equation. Reordering the terms we obtain the following 
expression: 
(23) 
{ }= + − − + + + − − + + + + + − ] ) 1 ( [ ) 1 ( 2 ] ) 1 ( [ ) 1 ( 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , t i t i it t i t i it it it t i it t i B E t i γ µ γ µ  
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B E
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µ µ  
 
Expression (23) enables us to compare, in marginal terms, the purchase versus the 
renting option as regards a permanent home from a tax point of view. The left side of 
expression (24) includes the marginal tax savings derived from the purchase of a permanent 
home. The right side denotes marginal tax savings derived from renting a permanent home. 
This expression shows that economic agents will be, at the margin, indifferent to any of the 
options mentioned above provided that present value of marginal tax savings are identical. 
That is to say that, at in terms of marginal tax savings, the opportunity cost of renting a 
                                                 
7 ,  it it
c W γ − = Κ ∂ ∂ / , which denotes  that tax credit decreases at a  it γ rate when the housing stock 
increases by one monetary unit.   15 
permanent home will be the purchase price or vice versa.  Expression (23) could not be 
verified in two cases: 
 
-When  the  tax  system  is  not  neutral  with  respect  to  the  choice  between  the 
purchase and the rental of a permanent home. As we saw in section 1 the Spanish PIT 
provides a better tax treatment for the purchase.  
 
-The verification of equation (23) requires that   0 1 , = = + t i it µ µ , i. e., that perfect 
capital markets exist, characterized by the fact that all the agents may have the liquidity they 
need at the market interest rate in every time period. When this is verified, the shadow 
price  of  a  marginal  monetary  unit  of  funds  to  finance  a  house  is  null  1....n i    0 = ∀ = it π . 
Conversely, when capital markets are imperfect, the shadow price will be positive, being 
greater in value the higher the degree of financial restriction faced by individuals.  
 
 
Assuming imperfections in capital markets, the degree of financial restriction faced 
by  houses’  seekers  is  supposedly  positive  and  constant  in  the  short  term,  i.  e. 
0 1 , > ≅ + t i it u u . Moreover, departing from the rational expectations assumption we may 
substitute an observed value for an expected one in (23). We use logarithms on both sides 
of expression (23) and we add a dummy variable for the effects that do not change over time 
and  another  for  the  temporal  ones.  However,  we  introduce  a  variable  including  the 
expectations error 1 , + t i ε , which is white noise and is not correlated with any information 
available in period t.  
   16 
Finally  in  order  to  include  in  more  detail  the  differences  between  houses’ 
demanders a change in scale has been carried out by dividing the different variables in 
expression (23) for each tax unit by the net base. The expression to be estimated is (24) 
where the asterisk denotes the change of scale mentioned above. 
 
                  (24) 
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  Parameters to be estimated in the expression (24) are 1 Φ ,  2 Φ ,  1 α  y  2 α . The first 
two show the role of financial restrictions on permanent home seekers: the purchase of a 
house in the first case and its rental in the second one. The two other parameters are 
related to the effects of tax incentives on the respective choice of a purchase and rental of a 
permanent home. 
 
4.  Data used and parameterization 
 
 
In the econometric estimate, we use a representative sample of the Panel of income 
taxpayers containing tax micro data of 3216 individuals. This panel has been constructed by 
the Instituto de Estudios Fiscales of the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Finance. Given 
that  the  decisions  regarding  a  demand  for  a  dwelling  are  taken  within  the  family,  two 
separate tax returns filed by spouses are combined into one. In this way the number of tax 
units is 1423 in this study. 
 
The  econometric  estimate  of  expression  (24)  must  face  the  upper-censored 
problem  related  to  restrictions  on  tax  deductions  introduced  by  regulations  when 
purchasing and renting a house. However, the censored problem is not really relevant.   17 
Firstly, the number of cases of upper-censored tax deductions for interest is smaller than 
10%. Secondly, there is not a single upper-censored deduction from tax liability. Finally, the 
censor observed in the tax deduction for rents is less than 20% -in this case it is more 
significant because of the absolute low limit operating in this tax deduction-.  
 
The gross interest rate  it i  used was the average rate applicable to mortgage loans 
for terms longer than three year periods provided by the range of financial institutions. The 
values used were, respectively, 16,16%, 15,84%, 14,82%, 14,06% and 10,78%, respectively 
for the tax years 1991 - 1995. The net interest rate paid by borrowers in each tax year is 
determined as  ( ) it it t i − 1 , where the PIT rate  it t  is obtained by applying the tax rate of the 
related tax year to the net tax base.  
 
The tax saving in relation to the tax liability per marginal unit of investment in a 
house purchase and on the rental of a house are respectively  15 , 0 = γ  and  15 , 0 = Γ .  Note 
that even in the upper-censored cases, the marginal deduction rate and not the average one 
has been used as a measurement of the marginal tax saving. This is due to the fact that the 
total invested in a house and the total expenses are not directly observable. In spite of that 
we think that the bias created by this hypothesis will not be significant for the reasons we 
gave before. 
 
The calculation of liquidity for each home seeker would require bearing in mind 
income as well as financial, immovable capital and durable assets.
8 However the options 
provided by the data panel on personal income tax are limited as regards the different 
capital assets: 
   18 
- The panel of income taxpayers does not contain information in a strict sense 
about the capital assets of families. That is, it does not capture the stock valuation 
of the different types of wealth cited above. 
 
- The information on wealth provided by the panel of income taxpayers is always 
indirect and partial. It is indirect because it gives us an imperfect and approximate 
value through the income flows of this capital. For instance, we do not know the 
stock  of  securities  with  fixed  income  but  we  do  know  the  value  of  dividends 
derived from it. It is partial because we do not have complete information on some 
types of capital assets such as, for instance, capital in vehicles, ships or works of art. 
 
Consequently, restrictions on constructing this variable are numerous, which means 
that we must be careful when interpreting the results. For this reason we have had to build 
a proxy variable for liquidity (LF). This variable includes income from movable capital –
current accounts, dividends, Treasury bonds, etc.-, the savings obtained in terms of tax 
deductions related to houses other than the permanent home, investment on cultural works 
as well as charitable donations allowable in each tax year. The degree of financial restriction 









= ≅ µ         (25) 
 
  With a net tax base with a value (BL), the degree of financial restriction is smaller 
the greater LF is and will be higher when LF is smaller. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
8  See Estrada and Buisán (1999) for a discussion.   19 
5.  Results 
 
In the estimation of the model (24) we have used a Maximum Likelihood with 
Complete  Information,  and  iteration  control  using  the  Generalized  Moment  Method 
(GMM)– Marquardt’s algorithm-. This model’s equations have been stated in first differences 
to eliminate the action of fixed effects in the estimates. 
 
  Other  alternative  methods  of  estimation  have  been  tested.  These  have  been  as 
follows: GMM for time series and their different options, two-stage and three-stage least 
squares. The results of all these are similar to those we set out below. This is the same 
when different control techniques are used for iterations which make the estimates more 
robust. Individual significance of parameters is analyzed through the T Student test and the 
joint  significance  is  carried  out  using  the  Wald’s  test.  Detecting  a  self  correlation  is 
performed using the Durbin-Watson’s statistic.   
 
Firstly, the model has been estimated using the entire sample. That is to say, tax 
units are used, regardless of whether they benefit from tax deductions for purchasing or 
renting a home. The results of this analysis are shown in Table 1. Moreover, the model has 
been checked with two sub-samples. Subsample 1 consists of tax units with tax deductions 
for the purchase or rental in a tax year. Thus, we study taxpayers who meet one of the 
following requirements: a) They have bought a home before or during the period studied, 
b) They have been tenants of a permanent home for or during the period studied, c) They 
meet one or two of the previous requirements such as for example, firstly being a tenant 
and then a purchaser of a permanent home. The results of this analysis are shown in Table 
2. Finally, Subsample 2 consists of taxpayers who  benefited from tax deduction for the 
purchase or rental every year. The results are shown in Table 3.   20 
 
  The individual significance of estimated parameters, as well as the joint-significance 
of the Wald’s test has a degree of confidence higher than 95%. However, the Durbin-
Watson’s statistic indicates that there is no self-correlation problem in the model studied, 
the residuals tending to behave as a white noise. 
 
  As regards the purchase of a permanent home, results obtained are as follows. 
Firstly, the relative weighting of parameter  1 Φ  is high in all estimates carried out, which 
confirms the barrier effect of liquidity when deciding to buy a permanent home. Secondly, 
in  relative  terms,  financial  restrictions  are  more  relevant  than  tax  tools  assisting  the 
purchase when we test the model with Subsample 1 –which includes, among other people, 
those who purchase their home in this period. However, tax incentives for purchasing a 
house notably increase their relative weighting when our analysis focuses on Subsample 2 –
which only contains individuals who bought their home before the period analyzed-. This 
means that the results seem to suggest that the relative significance of financial and tax 
variables is related to the subsample used. Thus, entering into a contract seems to be for 
the most part influenced by liquidity with tax incentives having a secondary role in this 
case. On the contrary, tax incentives are important once the purchase contract has been 
executed.  
 
  As for the rental of a permanent home, the following conclusions may be drawn. 
Firstly, the relative importance of parameters  2 Φ  and  2 α  is less in all studied cases than 
that observed for parameters associated with the purchase of a permanent home. Secondly, 
the relative weighting of the financial restriction and tax incentives for renting a house are 
very similar when the model is tested with the two subsamples previously mentioned. Finally,   21 
taxation does not play a significant role with respect to taxpayers renting a house as their 
habitual residence during the period under analysis (subsample 2).  
 
Table 1 
Total Sample of PI Taxpayers 
(1421 observations) 
Parameters  Weight of Coefficients  Significance 
1 Φ   0.37  > 99% 
1 α   0.19  > 99% 
2 Φ   0.27  > 99% 
2 α   0.17  > 99% 
Wald’s Contrast ( 1 Φ = 2 Φ = 1 α = 2 α =0)  Rejected at 95% 




Taxpayers  with a Tax Deduction for the Purchase or Rental of a Home in a Tax Year 
(883 observations) 
Parameters  Weight of Coefficients  Significance 
1 Φ   0,37  > 75% 
1 α   0,30  > 60% 
2 Φ   0,16  > 60% 
2 α   0,17  > 75% 
Wald’s Contrast ( 1 Φ = 2 Φ = 1 α = 2 α =0)  Rejected at 95% 




Taxpayers  with a Tax Deduction for the Purchase or Rental of a Home during every Tax 
Year in the Sample 
(334 observations) 
Parameters  Weight of Coefficients  Significance 
1 Φ   0,24  > 95% 
1 α   0,73  > 95% 
2 Φ   0,02  > 95% 
2 α   0,01  > 95% 
Wald’s Contrast ( 1 Φ = 2 Φ = 1 α = 2 α =0)  Rejected at 95% 
Wald’s Contrast ( 1 Φ = 1 α ;  2 Φ = 2 α )  Rejected at 95% 
 
 
   22 
6.  Final remarks 
 
 
  The role of liquidity and PIT tax incentives in the choice between purchasing and 
renting a house as a way of obtaining a permanent home is studied. For this we constructed 
and tested a theoretical model based on Euler’s equation using a representative sample 
from the 1991-1995 Panel of income taxpayers. 
 
A  Maximum  Likelihood  with  Complete  Information  through  GMM  was  the 
estimation procedure used. Results are considered to be robust as they are very similar to 
those obtained with other alternative estimation methods. Evidence suggests that financial 
restrictions are more important than tax incentives when deciding to purchase a permanent 
home. This result is very similar to those obtained in other studies using micro data for the 
Spanish case as for example Lasheras, Salas and Pérez Villacastín (1994) and Sanromán 
(2000). On the other hand, tax incentives are more important once the dwelling has been 
bought. These results call into question the design of Spanish public policies in relation to 
housing. In short, tax incentives for the purchase of a home are hardly effective at all when 
individuals face a high degree of financial restriction. This seems to indicate that it would 
be advisable to have recourse to other tools that may smooth financial restrictions such as 
public warranties or subsidies. As for the rental, the relative weighting of tax incentives and 
financial  variables  is  very  similar,  it  being  in  general  small  for  those  individuals  who 
habitually rent a house as their permanent home.  
The results obtained must be considered with caution because of the limitation with 
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